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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
ORDER 
Case No. 900283-CA 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Caroline Thelma Nunley, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
This matter is before the Court upon a request for leave to 
withdraw from the appeal filed February 1, 1991, by appellant's 
counsel, Stephen R. McCaughey. 
Now therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion is 
deferred until the Court has had the opportunity to determine 
whether the case is wholly frivolous. Anders v. California, 3 86 
U.S. 738, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967). 
Dated this '~* day of February, 1991. 
BY THE COURT: 
si 
Judge Gregory K. Orme 
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I. JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal in this matter 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §78-2(a)-3(2)(f). 
II. NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from the Third Judicial District Court in and for 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
III. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1) Whether or not the trial court erred in not granting the 
defendant's motion to dismiss at the conclusion of the evidence. 
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
CONSIDERED DETERMINATIVE 
1. U. C. A. 58-37-8(l)(a)(ii). 
2. U. C. A. 58-37-2(5)(b). 
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V. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a conviction by a jury of five counts of 
distribution of a controlled substance in violation of U. C. A. 
58-37-8( l ) (a)( i i ) . 
VI. RELEVANT FACTS 
The defendant was charged and convicted of five counts of 
violating U. C. A. §58-37-8(1 )(a)(ii). The information charged her in the 
language of the statute. The statute provides several alternative acts or 
elements which may be a basis for a conviction. The alternative but 
separate acts include actual distribution, offering to distribute, agreeing to 
distribute, consenting to distribute or arranging to distribute, all of which 
apply to either a controlled substance or a counterfeit substitute. 
In this matter the "probable cause" statement in support of the 
information stated that the five counts were based on an actual 
distribution of a controlled substance, marijuana. 
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Just prior to trial, the State informed the defendant's attorney 
that the marijuana which was the basis of counts one through four, had 
been lost and thus was not available for use at trial. 
Defense counsel, prior to the start of the trial made a motion in 
limine, requesting that the court not allow evidence of any toxicology 
examination performed on the "lost" marijuana involved in counts one 
through four. (T-l) 
After hearing the motion and argument, the court made the 
following ruling: 
" . . . to deprive the defense of the opportunity to 
examine and cross-examine in regards to the chain of 
evidence with the substance, would be to deprive the 
defense of a constitutionally protected right, and I 
thing it would be absolutely glaring error of the court 
to allow the toxicology report in without the defense 
having the opportunity to test the accuracy of that 
report and of the sample that arrived there. (T-5). 
I will grant the motion in limine as to the 
toxicology reports in regards to those where the 
packets have been lost that those reports delt with." (T-6) 
The defendant's attorney then made a motion to dismiss counts 
one through four on the basis that without the actual marijuana and 
without evidence of any chemical analysis of the substance, there would be 
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no way the State could prove the element of marijuana. (T-6-7). The 
prosecutor made the following response: 
" . . . the State would be opposed to that. We would 
note that the charges conform to the statute in that the 
statute makes it illegal to do any of these things: to 
distribute a controlled or counterfeit controlled substance, 
to offer to do so, to agree to do so, to consent to do so, or 
to arrange to do so. And all of those theories are present 
as alternatives for the State in the information." (T-7-8). 
There is then some discussion between the prosecutor and the 
court about the definition of a counterfeit substance. The court then made 
the following ruling: 
" . . . I am going to deny the motion to dismiss because 
I think the State, because they have lost the evidence, 
failed to prove it was marijuana, that they don't fail on the 
cause of action as such if the evidence is that it appeared 
to be. It was a counterfeit substance that had the 
appearance because that in itself would be a violation 
of the statute, and you don't need to do much. 
. . . and likewise, because the State can no longer 
prove something was marijuana, they still have open 
the opportunity to show that it was—it was either. 
And they can't prove that it was one, but that doesn't 
deprive them of the right to show that it was a 
counterfeit substance. And so based on that, the 
motion is denied. (T-9-10) (emphasis added). 
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The State's witness, Zane Smith, testified about five separate 
occasions on which he purchased a quantity of marijuana from the 
defendant. In response to defense counsel's question, Officer Smith stated 
that he was not able to say that the substance he allegedly purchased from 
the defendant was marijuana. (T-79). The State offered exhibit one, the 
bag of alleged marijuana purchased on October 19 and it was received 
without objection from the defendant. (T-119). 
Following admission of exhibit one, the State was unable to 
produce the expert witness who had analyzed the substance and who could 
testify that it was in fact marijuana. The State rested without offering any 
evidence that the substance was marijuana other than the opinion of 
Officer Smith. 
Following the State's evidence, the defendant made a motion to 
dismiss all counts against the defendant on the basis that the State had 
failed to prove that the substance allegedly distributed by the defendant 
was marijuana. (T-148) The State's response was that the evidence 
showed that marijuana had in fact been distributed. The theory of a 
counterfeit substance was not mentioned. (T-149) 
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The court denied the motion and made the following relevant 
comments: 
" . . . the evidence before the court is that the fact 
that the substance in question was marijuana . . . this 
evidence is based upon the testimony of Officer Smith, 
who testified as t his background, his training, having 
gone to various schools for drug identification. And 
he gave as a conclusion an opinion and stated his 
opinion without objection (emphasis added) that it 
was marijuana. And he gave a further basis of his 
opinion that that was based upon his training 
and the appearance and the odor. And so there is 
sufficient evidence, even without a toxicology 
report, to go to the jury and for that reason the 
motion is denied. (T-150-1) 
The defendant was convicted on all five counts. 
VII. STATEMENT OF COUNSEL 
I, STEPHEN R. McCAUGHEY, represent to this court that I am 
appellant counsel for the defendant and have read the transcript of the 
trial. I would represent that I do not believe the defendant has any 
meritorious appeal issues and that this appeal is frivolous. As a. result of 
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this conclusion, this brief is being prepared along the guidelines 
established in Ander v. California. 386 U. S. 738 (1967) as adopted by the 
Utah Supreme Court in State v. Clavton. 639 P.2d 168 (Utah 1981). 
The defendant, Caroline Nunley, has been sent a copy and any 
points or comments from her will be submitted in a supplemental brief 
with in ten days. 
Vm. ARGUMENT 
It is the opinion of appellant counsel after a careful review of 
the record in this case, that there are no meritorious issues to be raised on 
appeal. 
The only issue with any possible validity is that all counts should 
have been dismissed on motion of the defendant at the end of the State's 
case for the reason that there was insufficient evidence as a matter of law 
to establish the element of the controlled substance as marijuana. 
The defendant was charged with five counts under the U. C. A. 
58-37-8(1 )(a)(ii) alleging in the language of the statute that she: 
"distributed a controlled or counterfeit substance 
. . ." (emphasis added). 
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The statute clearly prohibits the distribution of either a 
controlled substance or a counterfeit substance. U. C. A. 58-37-2(5)(b) 
defines counterfeit substance as: 
"any substance that is represented to be a 
controlled substance." 
It is clear that the statute prohibits the distribution of a 
controlled substance or a substance represented by the distributor to be a 
controlled substance. State v. Hicken. 659 P.2d 1038 (Utah 1983). The 
evidence at trial was that on all occasions the defendant represented the 
substance in question to be marijuana. Other evidence in the form of 
opinion evidence by the police officer was offered to support the 
contention that the substance appeared to be what the defendant said it 
was, marijuana. 
The jury found that the State had proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant distributed a substance which was either 
marijuana or was represented to be marijuana, c.f. State v. Harrison, 601 
P.2d 922 (Utah 1979). 
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IX. CONCLUSION 
This appeal has been prepared pursuant to the guidelines in 
Anders v. California. 386 U. S. 738 (1967) as adopted by this State in State 
v. Clayton. 639 P.2d 168 (Utah 1981). Counsel has read the record and set 
forth any possible points to be argued in defendant's favor on appeal. 
Having done so, and having the belief that the appeal is frivolous, I 
respectfully request this Court to permit the withdrawal of the Salt Lake 
Legal Defender Association from this appeal. 
However, if the Court deems further briefing to be helpful, this 
counsel is most willing to do so. 
DATED this J 7 day of January, 1991. 
STEPHEN^. McCAUGHE 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Appellant's 
Brief was mailed on this 2L& day of January, 1991 via first class mail, 
postage prepaid, to: 
Attorney General 
236 State Capital 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
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